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 On behalf of the National Lawyers Guild National Immigration Project (NLGNIP), the 
Center for Immigrants' Rights (Center) at the Pennsylvania State University's Dickinson School 
of Law prepared a white paper facilitated by a government report on the politicized hiring of 
immigration judges.  This white paper is based findings by the Department of Justice‘s Office of 
Professional Responsibility and Office of the Inspector General in their investigation of the 
illegal hiring of immigration judges during a period in the George W. Bush Administration.  The 
recommendations presented here are a product of this analysis and extensive research on data 
produced by individuals and organizations committed to due process and justice in immigration 
law. 
     The National Lawyers Guild National Immigration Project (NLGNIP) is a national 
organization comprised of lawyers, legal workers, and law students working to defend and 
expand the rights of all immigrants in the United States.  The National Immigration Project is 
particularly committed to working on behalf of battered women, people with HIV/AIDS, 
children, and noncitizen criminal defendants.  The NLGNIP provides legal assistance as well as 
other technical support to immigrant communities, legal practitioners, and advocates who work 
to advance the rights of noncitizens.  The organization seeks to promote justice and equality of 
treatment in all areas of immigration law, the criminal justice system, and social policies related 
to immigration. 
 The Center for Immigrants‘ Rights is an in-house clinic at the Pennsylvania State 
University Dickinson School of Law whose mission is to represent immigrants‘ interests through 
legal excellence, advocacy, education, and collaboration with key stakeholders and the 
community.  The Center teaches law students the skills necessary to be effective immigration 
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advocates and attorneys, primarily through organizational representation, where students work 
on innovative advocacy and policy projects relating to U.S. immigration policy and immigrants‘ 
rights. Students build professional relationships with government and nongovernmental 
policymakers, academics, and individuals. Students acquire essential practical and substantive 
knowledge of immigration lawyering and advocacy through project specific work, weekly 
classes, readings reflecting papers, and ―case rounds.‖ 
This paper was authored by Alham Usman and Christina Heischmidt, law students in the 
Center for Immigrants‘ Rights at the Pennsylvania State University Dickinson School of Law, 
under the supervision of Professor Shoba Sivaprasad Wadhia, Director of the Center for 
Immigrants‘ Rights at the Pennsylvania State University Dickinson School of Law.  Feedback 
and edits were also provided by Paromita Shah, Associate Director of the National Immigration 
Project of the National Lawyer‘s Guild; and Dan Kesselbrenner, Executive Director of the 
National Immigration Project of the National Lawyer‘s Guild.  Penn State law student Nicole 
Comstock assisted with citation checks.  The Center and NLGNIP thank Stephen H. Legomsky, 
Lory D. Rosenberg, and members of the National Immigration Project for their contributions and 
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III.  Quick Reference to the Immigration Court System 
 





















A.  Brief Explanation of the U.S. Immigration Courts 
 
IMMIGRATION COURT 
In the United States, there are fifty-seven immigration courts.  Generally, a noncitizen or the 
government has the right to appeal an immigration judge‘s (IJ) decision to the Board of 
Immigration Appeals (BIA).  In limited circumstances, the noncitizen or the government may 
file a motion to ―reopen‖ and/or ―reconsider‖ a case with the IJ.  Government attorneys are not 
appointed to noncitizens in immigration cases.   
 
THE BOARD OF IMMIGRATION APPEALS 
The BIA is not a federal court, but is a part of the EOIR where immigration court appeals are 
adjudicated.  Generally, if the BIA determines a case was wrongly decided, it remands the case 
to the immigration court.  In limited circumstances, the government or a noncitizen may file a 
motion to reopen and/or a motion to reconsider with the BIA.  BIA decisions are binding on all 
Department of Homeland Security (DHS) officers and immigration judges unless modified or 
overruled by the Attorney General or a Federal court.
1
  The Attorney General may however 
―certify‖ a BIA decision to him/herself and thereafter issue a new independent decision.
2
  BIA 
decisions may be appealed to one of the twelve federal courts of appeals.   
 
THE FEDERAL COURTS OF APPEALS 
The federal appeals courts review decisions by the BIA.  In recent years, Congress has restricted 
judicial review for certain noncitizens ordered removed for criminal reasons and denials of 
discretionary relief, among other decisions.  Generally, federal appeals courts can only decide 
cases based on the administrative record in the immigration court and the BIA.  If a federal 
appeals court reverses a decision of the Board of Immigration Appeals, the case can be remanded 
to the BIA.  The BIA can then remand the case to the immigration court. 
 
THE UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT 
If the federal appeals court denies a case, appellants may apply for certiorari to the United States 
Supreme Court.  Such cases are rarely granted. 
                                                          
1
  See BIA Decisions, 
http://www.uscis.gov/portal/site/uscis/menuitem.eb1d4c2a3e5b9ac89243c6a7543f6d1a/?vgnextoid=f2c29c7755cb9
010VgnVCM10000045f3d6a1RCRD&vgnextchannel=f2c29c7755cb9010VgnVCM10000045f3d6a1RCRD (last 
visited May 7, 2009). 
2
  For example, in a decision titled Matter of J-S-, 24 I. & N. Dec. 520 (AG 2008), the Attorney General held that 
spouses of individuals subjected to forced sterilization or abortion are not per se entitled to refugee status.  Notably, 
this decision, which the Attorney General ―certified‖ to himself, overrules two precedential cases, Matter of C-Y-Z-, 
21 I&N Dec. 915 (BIA 1997) and Matter of S-L-L-, 24 I&N Dec. 1 (BIA 2006). 
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B.  Brief History of the Executive Office of Immigration Review 
 
The EOIR was created within the Department of Justice (DOJ) on January 9, 1983.  This 
agency constitutes the judicial arm of the government‘s role in immigration by combining the 
Immigration Judge division, which had previously been held within the former Immigration and 
Naturalization Service (INS), with the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA).  The EOIR is 
headed by a Director who reports directly to the Attorney General.
3
  
The EOIR consists of three sub-agencies: the Office of the Chief Immigration Judge 
(OCIJ), the BIA, and the Office of the Chief Administrative Hearing Officer.
4
  The OCIJ 
manages the U.S. immigration courts.  The Office of the Chief Administrative Hearing Officer 
handles employment cases relating to immigration.
5
  The judges in this court system are 
employees of the Department of Justice, and are not part of the federal courts.  They are 
appointed by the Attorney General and do not have tenure, which is different from federal 
district court judges who are part of the judicial branch.
6
  These three sub-agencies handle all 
matters relating to immigration proceedings within the DOJ.  Another component of the DOJ, the 
Office of Immigration Litigation (OIL) is composed of lawyers and staff that coordinate civil 
immigration matters before the federal courts.
7
  
For sometime the EOIR has suffered from several institutional problems, including lack 
of resources and training.  Allegations of bias, immigration judge misconduct, and poor decision 
                                                          
3
  See Department of Justice: Executive Office of Immigration Review, Organizational Information and Breakdown, 
http://www.usdoj.gov/eoir/orginfo.htm (last visited Sept. 10, 2009). 
4
  See Department of Justice: Executive Office of Immigration Review, EOIR Responsibilities,   
http://www.usdoj.gov/eoir/responsibilities.htm (last visited Sept. 10, 2009). 
5
  See id. 
6
  See TRAC Reports-- Improving the Immigration Courts: Effort to Hire More Judges Falls Short (2008), 
http://www.trac.syr.edu/immigration/reports/189. 
7
  Department of Justice, Office of Immigration Litigation, http://www.usdoj.gov/civil/oil/index.htm (last visited 
Sept. 10, 2009). 
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making have afflicted the agency for decades.  These issues came to the fore in 2002 with the 
promulgation of former Attorney General Ashcroft‘s ―reform‖ regulations which established a 
―streamlining‖ process that was followed by the deterioration of quality of decision making at 
the BIA.  In an unprecedented move, Ashcroft ―reassigned‖ BIA members based on their 
jurisprudential views and downsized the BIA from twenty-three members to eleven members, 
despite the increased BIA caseload.  An article that reviewed the voting record and background 
of the reassigned judges found that ―[t]he limited data on the four cases may begin to suggest 
that conservative Board Members enjoyed some measure of protection when the Board was 
reduced in size.‖
8
  Notably, the reassigned BIA members were among the most senior and 
experienced on the Board.
9
  The new process raised further controversy by requiring most BIA 
decisions to be made by single-members without a written decision.
10
    
 Despite the arbitrary nature of the Ashcroft re-assignments, in 2006 then Attorney General 
Gonzales selected four new individuals to serve as BIA members, effectively replacing those 
who had been reassigned in 2002.  The newly selected BIA members did not go through a formal 
application process, nor was there an effort by the Attorney General to reinstate former BIA 
members who were reassigned or forced to resign.
11
  He went further to organize a 
comprehensive study of the immigration court system and announced a twenty-two point reform 
plan, which among other things, called for performance evaluations of immigration judges and 
                                                          
8
  Peter J. Levinson, The Facade of Quasi-Judicial Independence in Immigration Appellate Adjudications, 9 
BENDER‘S IMMIGR. BULL. 1154, 1159 (2004) (available at http://65.36.162.162/files/peter_article.pdf) (last visited 
Sept. 15, 2009). 
9
  Email from Lory Rosenberg, Director, AILF Action Center, to Shoba Sivaprasad Wadhia, Director of the Center 
for Immigrants‘ Rights, Pennsylvania State University Dickinson School of Law (Sept. 8, 2009) (on file with Shoba 
Sivaprasad Wadhia); see also Ricardo Alonso-Zaldivar, 5 On Immigration Board Asked to Leave: Critics Call it a 
Purge, L.A. TIMES, Mar. 12, 2003, at 16 (available at http://articles.latimes.com/2003/mar/12/nation/na-
immig12?pg=1). 
10
  See id. 
11




  The plan also included ―Codes of Conduct‖ which allowed for ex parte 
communication with DOJ officials in pending cases and called for attorneys representing the 
government in immigration cases in the courts of appeals to report ―poor quality‖ decisions of 
immigration judges and BIA members.
13
  Some of these reforms were met with criticism by the 
National Association for Immigration Judges, the union of immigration judges.
14
  Moreover, 
studies conducted by the Transactional Records Access Clearinghouse (TRAC) found that many 
of these reforms were never implemented or were implemented without enforcement 
mechanisms.
15
  In September 2008, the Director of EOIR testified about changes that were being 
implemented to address concerns about unprofessionalism, lack of training and oversight.
16
  
EOIR provided progress reports on Gonzales‘ 22-point plan in September 2008 and June 2009.
17
  
Nevertheless, a June 2009 report by TRAC concludes that nearly three years after the Gonzales‘ 
reforms were announced much remains to be done in the area of training, hiring, and quality 
assurance measures.
18
  In sum, the EOIR has continued to operate in an obscure framework with 
limited resources and controversial procedures.  The nation‘s immigration court system, which 
depends upon the proper functioning of the EOIR, therefore suffers. 
                                                          
12
 See Stephen H. Legomsky, Testimony Before the House Immigration Committee (September 23, 2008) (transcript 
available at http://judiciary.house.gov). See also, Attorney General Alberto R. Gonzales Outlines Reforms for 
Immigration Courts and Board of Immigration Appeals, http://www.usdoj.gov/opa/pr/2006/August/06_ag_520.html; 
Stephen H. Legomsky, Deportation and the War on Independence, 91 CORNELL L. REV.369 (2005-06). 
13
 See id. 
14
 See TRAC Reports-- Judicial Oversight v. Judicial Independence (2008),  
http://trac.syr.edu/immigration/reports/194/include/side_4.html.  
15
 See TRAC Reports-- Bush Administration Plan to Improve Immigration Courts Lags (2008), 
http://trac.syr.edu/immigration/reports/194/. 
16
  See Oversight of the Executive Office of Immigration Review:  Hearing Before the Subcomm. on  Immigration, 
Citizenship, Refugees, Border Security, and International Law of the H. Comm. On the Judiciary, 110
th
 Cong. 
(2008) (statement of Kevin Ohlson, Director, Executive Office for Immigration Review). 
17
  See U.S. Department of Justice Fact Sheet, EOIR’s Improvement Measures Progress Overview (Sept. 8, 2008) 
(available at http://www.usdoj.gov/eoir/press/08/EOIRs22ImprovementsProgressOverview090508v2.pdf); U.S. 
Department of Justice Fact Sheet, EOIR’s Improvement Measures Update, (June 5, 2009) (available at 
http://www.usdoj.gov/eoir/press/09/EOIRs22ImprovementsProgress060509FINAL.pdf). 
18
  TRAC Reports—Immigration Courts:  Still a Troubled Institution (2009), 
http://trac.syr.edu/immigration/reports/210/. 
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IV.  Participants in the Illegal Hiring Process 
John Ashcroft 
Title: Attorney General (Feb 2001 – Feb 2005) 
 
Alberto Gonzales 
Title: Attorney General (Feb 2005 – Sept 2007) 
 
Monica Goodling 
Title:  Office of the Attorney General (OAG) Counsel to the Attorney General (Oct 2005 – Apr  
2006)  
           OAG White House Liaison and Senior Counsel to the Attorney General (Apr 2006 –  
Apr 2007) 
           
 Illegally made political considerations in the hiring for career positions in various Department 
offices, including the immigration judge and Board of Immigration Appeals positions. 
 Continued to process waiver requests by interim U.S. Attorneys, although neither of her 
predecessors, Susan Richmond and Jan Williams, had done so. 
 
Kevin Ohlson 
Title: Deputy Director of EOIR (2003 – 2007) 
 
Susan Richmond 
Title:  OAG Advisor to Attorney General Ashcroft and Deputy White House Liaison (Feb 2001  
– May 2003) 
OAG White House Liaison (May 2003 – Mar 2005) 
 
Kevin Rooney 
Title: Director of the Executive Office of Immigration Review (EOIR) (2003 – 2007) 
 
Kyle Sampson 
Title:  OAG Counselor to Attorney General Ashcroft (Aug 2003 – Feb 2005) 
           OAG Deputy Chief of Staff to the Attorney General (Feb 2005 – Sept 2005) 
           OAG Chief of Staff to Attorney General Gonzales (Sept 2005 – Mar 2007) 
 
 Established the illegal hiring process of immigration judges and Board of Immigration Appeals 
members upon his arrival at the OAG as Counsel to the Attorney General in 2003. 
 
Jan Williams 
Title:  OAG White House Liaison (Mar 2005 – Apr 2006) 
 




Title: OAG Deputy White House Liaison (July 2006 – Apr 2007) 
 
 Reported to Goodling during most of Goodling‘s tenure as White House Liaison. 
 Attended numerous interviews conducted by Goodling and occasionally conducted portions of 
interviews or entire interviews on her own based on Goodling‘s guidelines. 
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V. Executive Summary 
 
 While the United States is known as a nation of immigrants, the U.S. immigration system 
has faced many challenges and criticisms throughout its history.  Today, questions of illegal 
immigration and immigration reform are in the public eye.  Indeed, immigration is a complex 
and sensitive issue with many considerations and interests.  Both Republicans and Democrats 
face conflicting demands from their constituents.  Issues like migration, national security, human 
rights, foreign relations, and jobs are only part of the calculus.  One critical question is how this 
nation will move forward with a nascent program aimed at improving its immigration court 
system.  The nation‘s immigration courts are a principal arena in which immigration laws are 
interpreted and applied, handling over 300,000 cases yearly.  Challenging national adjudication 
goals and nagging institutional problems are only aggravated by the assignment of judges 
lacking knowledge of immigration law and a politicized hiring process.  Since noncitizens are 
not entitled to appointed counsel, the adverse impact on due process is staggering and often 
irreversible.  The illegal hiring of immigration judges on top of the remarkable resource and due 
process deficiencies that have plagued the EOIR since at least 2002, have brought the need for 
immigration court reform to the forefront.  This white paper aims to assist in responding to this 
vital imperative through an analysis of the political hiring of immigration judges during the 
George W. Bush Administration.   
 While the EOIR staff members, including then Deputy Director Kevin Ohlson and  
former Director Kevin Rooney, admittedly were aware of the blatant illegality of the hiring 
process discussed in this report, they failed to formally or informally raise objections or protest 
the illegal process to senior Department officials.  Rather, despite their knowledge, the EOIR 
staff members implemented the illegal process.  The illegal process was eventually uncovered in 
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connection with the unprecedented and controversial firing of nine U.S. Attorneys by the 
Department of Justice in 2006, and the initiation of a discrimination lawsuit by Guadeloupe 
Gonzalez who applied for immigration judge positions in Texas to which two lesser qualified 
male candidates (including her direct subordinate) were appointed.  Thereafter, the DOJ‘s Office 
of Professional Responsibility (OPR) and the Office of the Inspector General (OIG) launched a 
joint investigation into the matter and uncovered evidence of politicized and discriminatory 
hiring of civil service positions, including immigration judges and Board of Immigration 
Appeals members.  Immigration judge and Board positions are career immigration positions for 
which U.S. law and Department of Justice policy prohibit the consideration of political 
affiliations.  The report produced by the OPR and OIG, dubbed the ―Goodling Report,‖ found 
conclusive evidence of political hiring of immigration judges between 2004 and 2007. 
 This paper analyzes the Goodling Report, considering the impact of those illegal hirings 
in which numerous judges were appointed based solely on Republican Party affiliations and 
conservative political views.  Irrespective of whether the illegally hired judges are ―good‖ or 
―bad,‖ this paper is interested in the overall impact of poor decision-making on U.S. immigration 
law and immigrants‘ due process rights.  While this report recommends that the illegally hired 
immigration judges be removed and provided an opportunity to reapply, the problem of 
unqualified decision-making in immigration law presents a problem that extends beyond the 
employment of those judges.  As Judge Richard A. Posner noted, "the adjudication of these 
[immigration] cases at the administrative level has fallen below the minimum standards of legal 
justice."
19
  When placed in the larger context of an already tainted immigration court system, the 
illegal hiring of immigration judges not only undermined the integrity of the hiring process, but 
                                                          
19
  Benslimane v. Gonzales, 430 F.3d 828, 830 (7th Cir. 2005).  
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exacerbated an already broken system.  This paper considers the necessary reforms to remedy 
and prevent such incidents and, most importantly, contains recommendations to strengthen the 
U.S. immigration court system and its guiding principles of law and justice.   
We are hopeful that the promises of the new American leadership will guide the nation 
toward the necessary reforms in the U.S. immigration court system, and offer the following 
recommendations as a starting point: 
Reapplication Process For Illegally Hired Judges and EOIR Assessment 
1.  The DOJ should require every individual hired through the illegal hiring process to reapply 
for his or her position through a merit-based hiring process, such as the process outlined in item 
3. 
 
2.  All immigration judge vacancies should be filled in accordance with the legal hiring process 
including minimum qualifications in immigration law. 
 
3.  Nation-wide postings requiring the following qualifications should be used for vacancies: 
 
1. U.S. Citizenship;  
2. 7 years of relevant post-bar experience, of which 5 years include experience in 
immigration practice, teaching, advocacy or litigation; 
3. Knowledge of U.S. immigration laws and procedures; and 
4. The candidate must possess 2 or more of the following: 
a. Substantial litigation experience, preferably in a high-volume content; 
b. Experience handling complex legal issues; 
c. Experience conducting administrative hearings; or 
d. Knowledge of judicial practices and procedures. 
 
4. The DOJ should create or expand an existing position within EOIR that coordinates closely 
with the Office for Professional Responsibility and monitors EOIR practices and policies, 
including but not limited to hiring, retention, and firing.    The EOIR should create a mechanism 
for the public and government officials to file complaints alleging illegal practices and policies.  
 
5. The EOIR should ensure that its hiring policy draws potentially eligible candidates equally 
from the government and private sectors.  
 
 
Hiring and Evaluation of Personnel  
 
1.  Increase the number of immigration judges through an efficient and non-political vetting 
process in order to diminish the current backlog of cases. 
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2.  Establish minimum qualifications for immigration judges and BIA members. 
 
3.  Prohibit removal or threat of removal of legally hired immigration judges and BIA members, 
and restore decisional independence of judges.
20
    
 
 
Immigration Judge and BIA Member Evaluations 
 
1.  Ensure that performance reviews include a metric for professional conduct and gauging 
independence and impartiality in decisionmaking.  
 
2.  Require that immigration judges complete a basic immigration law examination to assess 
their knowledge of U.S. immigration law.
21
   
 
3.  Improve training for immigration judges and BIA members. 
 
 
Board of Immigration Appeals  
 
1. Repeal the streamlining processes within the EOIR implemented by former AG Ashcroft in 
2002. 
 
2.  Offer BIA positions to the former BIA judges who were reassigned or who were forced to 
resign under former AG Ashcroft.  
 




4.  Reinstate the requirement that precedent decisions be decided by the BIA en banc. 
 




6.  Restore 3-member panels for BIA reviews, especially for cases involving asylum, 
withholding of removal, and relief under the Convention Against Torture.  Rescind regulations 
that limit three-panel review of all but a limited number of facially invalid or frivolous cases.
24
 
                                                          
20
  See Stephen H. Legomsky, Testimony Before the House Immigration Committee (September 23, 2008) 
(available at http://judiciary.house.gov). 
21
  U.S. Department of Justice Fact Sheet, EOIR’s Improvement Measures Update, supra note 17 (―EOIR began 
testing new immigration judges in April 2008, and new BIA members in August 2008.‖). 
22
  See Stephen H. Legomsky, Testimony Before the House Immigration Committee (September 23, 2008) 
(available at http://judiciary.house.gov). 
23
  See OBAMA-BIDEN TRANSITION PROJECT, IMMIGRATION POLICY: TRANSITION BLUEPRINT 2 (Nov. 16, 2008), 
http://otrans.3cdn.net/1414e4fb31bb801ef0_wwm6i6uks.pdf. 
24




1.  The list of immigration judges included in the survey was incomplete, and was created by 
corresponding other sources‘ list of immigration judges to the date on which a particular judge 
was hired.  The DOJ should release the names of former and current immigration judges illegally 
hired between 2004 and 2007. 
 
2.  All decisions, including BIA affirming the lower court, should include a written explanation 
of the judge‘s rationale for the decision. 
 




    
 
 
                                                          
25
  See Stephen H. Legomsky, Testimony Before the House Immigration Committee (September 23, 2008) 
(available at http://judiciary.house.gov). 
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CHAPTER 2:  OFFICE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY AND THE OFFICE 
OF THE INSPECTOR GENERAL REPORT ON THE POLITICIZED HIRING OF 
IMMIGRATION JUDGES 
 
I.  Introduction 
 
“What is it about Bush that makes you want to serve him?” 
 
 
In March 2007, upon being forwarded a complaint by the former Acting Chief of Staff to the 
Attorney General, Chuck Rosenberg, the U.S. Department of Justice‘s Office of Professional 
Responsibility and the Office of the Inspector General launched investigations into hiring 
practices for civil service positions.  Rosenberg‘s complaint alleged that Monica Goodling, then 
Senior Counsel to the Attorney General and the Department of Justice‘s White House Liaison, 
refused to hire a candidate for a civil service position because the candidate was too ―liberal.‖
26
  
Civil service positions are not political appointments and must be made on a nonpartisan basis.
27
  
However, it soon became apparent that Goodling, among others in the DOJ, based hirings solely 
on a candidate‘s political affiliations with the Republican Party.  
While Goodling did not respond to inquiries by the OPR/OIG, during their investigations she 
was forced to testify before Congress on the politicized hirings within the DOJ.
28
  In her 
testimony, Goodling admitted to taking political beliefs and affiliations into account despite 
knowing that the positions she was interviewing for were career positions.  She described three 
categories of positions in which she was an interviewer.  First, in a ―very small number of cases,‖ 
                                                          
26
  OFFICE OF THE INSPECTOR GEN. & OFFICE OF PROF‘L RESPONSIBILITY, AN INVESTIGATION OF ALLEGATIONS OF 
POLITICIZED HIRING BY MONICA GOODLING AND OTHER STAFF IN THE OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL 25 
(2008) (available at http://www.usdoj.gov/oig/special/s0807/final.pdf) [hereinafter GOODLING REPORT]. 
27
  Career, or Schedule A positions are ―positions which are not of a confidential or policy-determining character.‖ 5 
C.F.R. § 213.3101. Political, or Schedule C positions are ―positions which are policy determining or which involve a 
close and confidential working relationship with the head of the agency or other key appointed officials.‖ 5 C.F.R. § 
213.3301(a).  
28
  Monica Goodling declined to be interviewed during the investigation and could not be compelled by the 
OPR/OIG as she was no longer employed by the DOJ.  She resigned from the DOJ on April 6, 2007, stating in her 
three-sentence resignation letter to Mr. Gonzales, ―May God bless you richly as you continue your service to 
America.‖  Goodling was granted immunity for her congressional testimony of May 23, 2007.  See GOODLING 
REPORT at 1. 
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the decisions for career positions ―may have been influenced in part based on political 
considerations.‖
29
  Second, she admitted to using political information when assessing career 
attorneys applying for temporary detail positions.
30
  Finally, Goodling admitted to taking 
political considerations into account in reviewing applications for immigration judges and BIA 
members.
31
  The Goodling Report used her testimony, along with written surveys from 
candidates who had interviewed with the OAG, to further investigate whether Goodling‘s 
predecessors at the Department‘s White House Liaison, Susan Richmond and Jan Williams, and 
Goodling‘s immediate supervisor, then OAG Chief of Staff Kyle Sampson, considered political 
or ideological affiliations when assessing candidates for career positions.  It became evident that 
the DOJ had in fact discriminated in the hiring of immigration judges, BIA members, and 
Assistant United States Attorney (AUSA) positions.  The extent of the politicization went 
beyond Monica Goodling who was hired at the OAG in October 2005.  Notably, the practice of 
politically hiring for career positions was revealed to be a systematic hiring policy implemented 
by Goodling‘s then supervisor Kyle Sampson in spring 2004.
32
  The EOIR then headed by 
Director Kevin Rooney and Deputy Director Kevin Ohlson, is charged with the hiring of 
immigration judges and BIA members.
33
  Although the Goodling Report found that the EOIR did 
not take part in the politicized hirings, the EOIR ultimately failed to report what was known of 
Sampson‘s politicized hiring policy to senior leaders at the DOJ.
34
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A.  Background: DOJ Hiring Standards 
Attorney positions in the DOJ fall into two distinct categories:  political or career positions.   
―Positions which are policy-determining or which involve a close or confidential working 
relationship with the head of an agency or other key appointed officials‖ are political 
appointments (known as Schedule C positions) requiring Senate approval.
35
  They include Staff 
Assistants to the Attorney General, and such.  Most attorney positions in the DOJ are career 
positions (Schedule A positions) designated under the Office of Personnel Management (OPM) 
as ―positions which are not confidential or policy-determining in character.‖
36
  They include: 
AUSAs, trial attorneys in litigation divisions, immigration judges, and Board of Immigration 
Appeals judges.
37
  For these positions, DOJ policy and federal law prohibit consideration of 
political affiliations.
38
  Additionally, the Department‘s policy prohibits discrimination.  The Code 
of Federal Regulations 42.1(a) states: ―It is the policy of the [DOJ] to seek to eliminate 
discrimination on the basis of race, color, religion, sex, sexual orientation, national origin, 
marital status, political affiliation, age or physical or mental handicap in employment within the 
Department.‖
39
  Although the regulations do not define ―political affiliation,‖ courts have 
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II. Illegal Hirings in the Department of Justice 
“Let me say his views on immigration are virtually identical to my own. I will get his 
resume for you, but don’t be dissuaded by his ACLU work on voting matters from 
years ago. This is a very different man, and particularly on immigration issues, he is 
a true member of the team.” 
 
Contrary to federal law and DOJ policy, the Goodling Report found that Monica Goodling 
intentionally used interview questions formulated to gauge how politically conservative a 
candidate was irrespective of whether s/he was seeking a career or political position.
41
  During 
some interviews for immigration judges Goodling was accompanied by Angela Williamson, then 
Deputy White House liaison, who took notes during interviews.  Williamson noted that 
Goodling‘s interview questions included: 
1. ―Tell us your political philosophy. There are different groups of conservatives by way 
of example: Social Conservative, Fiscal Conservative, Law & Order Republican.‖ 
2. ―What is it about Bush that makes you want to serve him?‖ 
3. ―Aside from the President, give us an example of someone currently or recently in 




Candidates interviewed during the investigation said they interpreted these questions by Monica 
Goodling as attempting to assess their political views.
43
  Of the 300 surveys received by the 
OPR/OIG of candidates interviewed by Goodling, 34 candidates said that they discussed 
abortion, and 21 said that they discussed gay marriage.
44
  At the time, then Senior Deputy Regina 
Schofield complained about these interview questions to Sampson and suggested that Goodling 
undergo interview training.
45
  However, no training was provided nor was any other change 
implemented as a result of Schofield‘s complaint.
46
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Instead, Goodling continued to assess candidates‘ political stances by further inquiring 
with the candidates‘ references as to, for example, a candidate‘s commitment to the Republican 
party.
47
  OPR/OIG also found evidence that she even conducted independent research by using a 
Westlaw and Lexis Nexis string search inherited from her predecessor, Jan Williams:  
―[First name of candidate]! And pre/2 [last name of candidate] w/7 bush or gore 
or republican! or democrat! or charg! or accus! or criticiz! or blam! or defend! or 
iran contra or Clinton or spotted owl or florida recount or sex! or controvers! or 
racis! or fraud! or investing! or bankrupt! or layoff! or downsize! or PNTR or 
NAFTA or outsource! or indict! or enron or Kerry or Iraq or wmd! or arrest! or 
intox! or fired or sex! or racis! or intox! or slur! or arrest! or fired or controvers! 




Goodling modified the string by inserting additional terms when searching candidates for 
immigration judge positions including: ―or immigrat! or immigrant! or asylum or DHS or ICE or 
border! or alien! or migrant! or criminal! or justice or judg!‖
49
  Furthermore, Goodling asked 
career candidates to fill out Presidential Personal Office Non Career Appointment forms (PPO).  
PPO forms, (which required applicants to identify their political party affiliation, their voting 
address for 2000 and 2004, and their involvement in the Bush/Cheney campaigns of 2000 and 
2004), are typically only completed by candidates applying for political positions.
50
  The 
OPR/OIG investigation found that candidates for immigration judge and BIA member positions 
were asked to complete PPO forms before being interviewed by Goodling.
51
  When some 
candidates objected to filling out the PPO form, Goodling advised that they had been given the 
form ―by mistake.‖
52
  The OPR/OIG report concluded this was demonstrative of her knowledge 
as to the hiring requirements for career positions. 
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A.  EOIR Hiring Process for Immigration Judges and BIA Members Before 2004  
 
As discussed previously, all immigration judge positions are Schedule A appointments.  
An immigration judge is an ―attorney whom [the] Attorney General appoints as administrative 
judge within EOIR.‖
53
  BIA members are ―attorneys appointed by the Attorney General.‖
54
  The 
BIA Chair is a Career Senior Executive Service (SES) position, which also follows an impartial 
career hiring process.
55
  The Vice Chairs are career positions as well.
56
  The remaining Board 
member positions are career Schedule A positions.
57
 
While the Attorney General has the authority to appoint immigration judges pursuant to 8 
U.S.C. §1101(b)(4) and 8 C.F.R.§1.1, this authority is normally delegated to the Deputy 
Attorney General or the Associate Attorney General.
58
  Since the 1980s, the DAG has re-
delegated the authority to the Office of the Attorney Recruitment and Management to take final 
action in employment matters for pay grades GS-15 and below, such as immigration judges.
59
  
Thus prior to Spring 2004, the hiring of the immigration judges was handled primarily by the 
EOIR.
60
  New positions were announced through a vacancy posting identifying the location, 




The minimum requirements for the position of immigration judge were as follows: 
1.   U.S. Citizenship; 
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2.   7 years of relevant post-bar experience; 
3.   1 year of previous federal service equivalent to GS-15 level; and 
4.   The candidate must possess 3 or more of the following: 
a. Knowledge of immigration laws and procedures; 
b. Substantial litigation experience, preferably in a high-volume content; 
c. Experience handling complex legal issues; 
d. Experience conducting administrative hearings; and 
e. Knowledge of judicial practices and procedures.62 
 
Under this policy only a few immigration judges were appointed pursuant to the Attorney 
General‘s ―direct appointment‖ authority with no personal involvement by the AG.
63
  
Additionally, the Chief Immigration Judge (CIJ) was responsible for the hiring process and 
Assistant CIJs reviewed, voted, and submitted recommendations to the CIJ on candidates to 
interview.
64
  Interviews were conducted by 3-member panels, which included the CIJ, and 
candidate recommendations were made subject to EOIR Director‘s approval.
65
  All 
recommendations made by the 3-member panels were accepted by the EOIR Director.
66
  The 
Director‘s subsequent recommendations were never rejected by the ODAG and the OARM.
67
  
Prior to Spring 2004, immigration judges were largely selected through the process outlined 
above.  
 
B.  The New Hiring Process for Immigration Judges and BIA Members  
 In June 2003, changes to the process for hiring immigration judges were considered when 
Laura Baxter, former Senior Counsel to the DAG, informed the EOIR that the ―Department is 
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going to take a greater role in IJ hiring.‖
68
  Baxter emphasized that the email was coming from 
Attorney General Ashcroft, which contradicts the OPR/OIG conclusion that former AG Ashcroft 
was not involved in the politicization process.
69
  Nonetheless, on October 8, 2003, an email from 
Kyle Sampson to Baxter stated that the ―White House may recommend‖ two candidates for the 
immigration judge positions and that Sampson wanted to send ―folks in the White House‖ a 
document detailing a proposed new process for hiring immigration judges.  An attached draft 
document to the email, ―Appointment of Immigration Judges,‖ stated that ―coordination‖ was 
necessary to ensure that ―lawyers known to the White House‖ would be ―informed of the 
opportunity‖ to become immigration judges.
70
  The following outlines the new process proposed 
for hiring implemented by Sampson: 
1. EOIR informs the DAG (then, Baxter) of the vacancy; 
2. Then, the DAG informs the OAG (then, Sampson) of the vacancy; 
3. Then the OAG informs White House OPA, White House PPO, and White 
House CO to solicit names of possible applicants; 
4. The OAG then transmits application package to identified candidates and the 
DAG transmits this list of possible applicants recommended by the White 
House to the EOIR; 
5. The EOIR then recommends candidates for an Attorney General appointment; 
and 
6. Finally, the AG appoints a candidate from that pool.71 
 
In 2004 the additional and only change by the OAG was the removal of the Office of the DAG 
(ODAG) from ―meaningful‖ input in immigration judge hiring.
72
 
 In October 2003, a candidate who had learned that Sampson was in charge of hiring 
immigration judges approached Sampson for a position, and in January 2004, the candidate was 
asked to be interviewed by the EOIR.  However, the candidate had been offered the position 
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prior to interviewing with the EOIR.  Nonetheless, the candidate was appointed as an 
immigration judge on April 4, 2004.
73
     
On April 5, 2004, a memo from the EOIR to the ODAG requested approval of a plan to 
create a Headquarters Immigration Court and hire four immigration judges for the new positions.  
The memo provided four candidates identified by the EOIR without involvement from the OAG 
or the White House.
74
  An email from Sampson to the ODAG criticized the appointments and 
reminded the ODAG that it was important to ―inform the AG and obtain his informal 
concurrence‖ before processing the recommended immigration judges.
75
  
In early April 2004, EOIR Director Rooney and Deputy Director Ohlson met with the 
ODAG staff in order to discuss routine matters, and announced an upcoming immigration judge 
vacancy in Chicago.
76
  Sampson attended this meeting and inquired extensively about the 
immigration judge appointment process.
77
  Ohlson explained the standard process and referenced 
the direct appointment avenue without discussing exemptions from civil service laws governing 
career positions.
78
  Upon Sampson‘s request to be notified of the Chicago vacancy post Rooney 
designated Ohlson as a point-of-contact for Sampson relating to the immigration judge hiring.
79
  
On April 19, 2004, Ohlson sent an email to Sampson stating that the ODAG authorized 
the EOIR to advertise for the Chicago position.
80
  Sampson responded to this email advising that 
an individual, a childhood friend of Karl Rove‘s, in Chicago would apply.
81
  He also requested 
confirmation upon the EOIR‘s receipt of the candidate‘s application.  On June 14, 2004, after 
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receiving another inquiry from Sampson, Ohlson sent an e-mail to Sampson stating that although 
hundreds of persons applied in response to the Chicago IJ announcement, ―[n]eedless to say [the 
candidate] made the cut.‖
82
  
Eventually the EOIR interviews, which bore no importance whatsoever to the hiring of 
candidates since positions were offered before the interviews, were completely removed from the 
process of selecting immigration judges.
83
  August 31, 2004 marked the last time EOIR selected 
candidates.
84
  Thereafter, all other immigration judges were selected by the OAG with input from 
the White House and other Republican party members.
85
    
 
C.  Kyle Sampson’s Story 
  
Sampson testified to Congress that until December 2006 he believed that the direct 
appointments of immigration judges were not subject to civil service laws and ―political criteria‖ 
was appropriate.
86
  He alleged that his understanding was based on ―fuzzy‖ recollections of the 
April 2004 meeting with Rooney and Ohlson, and advice from AAG Jack Goldsmith or Acting 
AAG Dan Levin of the Office of Legal Counsel (OLC).
87
  Rooney, however, stated that he knew 
that civil service laws applied and would have corrected Sampson‘s misunderstanding if a 
contrary suggestion had been made.
88
  The OLC‘s former AAGs Goldsmith and Levin stated 
their normal practice would be to memorialize any such advice, and there was no record of OLC 
staff providing such advice.
89
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The hiring situation came to the forefront upon the filing of a lawsuit by Guadalupe 
Gonzalez on September 30, 2005.  In Gonzalez v. Gonzales, plaintiff Guadalupe Gonzalez 
alleged that the DOJ discriminated against her based on gender and national origin when she was 
not selected in November 2004 for an immigration judge position in El Paso, Texas.
90
  Gonzalez 
was a career government immigration lawyer and Chief Counsel for the U.S. Immigration and 
Customs Enforcement (ICE) in El Paso.
91
  The two male applicants that were hired in her place 
were ICE attorneys junior to Gonzalez, one of whom was her direct subordinate.
92
   Both of these 
hirees were direct appointments provided to the EOIR by Sampson.
93
    
On December 11, 2006, Civil Division attorneys handling the Gonzalez case interviewed 
Sampson on the hiring process.  Sampson informed them that typically Republican candidates 




Thereafter, on December 26, 2006, OAG Deputy Chief of Staff Courtney Elwood 
emailed Sampson with a request from the Civil Division that immigration judge hiring be halted 
pending evaluation as to whether the ―current process used‖ violated ―Title VII or any other 
applicable law.‖
95
  Sampson responded to the email: ―Query: Are any political appts subject to 
disparate impact claims? I think not—if I‘m right, how can the AG‘s direct appt for IJs be?‖
96
  In 
January 2007 a follow up email from Elwood to Sampson advised that immigration judge hiring 
should be terminated until the OLC and Civil Division resolved whether the current procedure 
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―comports with merit system principles.‖
97
  Sampson responded to Elwood stating: ―I‘m 
disturbed…I got advice from the OLC back in 2003-2004.  I‘ve never before thought that the 
Attorney General‘s direct appointment authority was required to comport with the merit system 
principles (as I understand them).‖
98
  Elwood advised Sampson that the OLC had no record of 
providing such advice and requested that Sampson ―narrow the time frame‖ in which he might 




The OLC unsuccessfully searched for the existence of this advice following up with 
former AAG Goldsmith and former Acting AAG Levin.  Levin stated that he had ―no 
recollection whatever of being asked about IJ or BIA while he was [t]here.‖
100
  He added that 
because the issue of immigration judge hiring was beyond his expertise he would have consulted 
senior career attorneys for an accurate answer.
101
  Levin further stated that Sampson‘s ―very 
political‖ nature would have alerted his ―radar‖ if such advice were requested.
102
  Goldsmith also 
replied that he had ―no recollection whatsoever.‖
103
  This account was confirmed by other senior 
career attorneys at the OLC, as well as confirmation of the usual practice of memorializing 
advice. 
Additionally, the aforementioned October 8, 2003 email from Sampson to Baxter 
demonstrates that Sampson sought to appoint immigration judges seeking political positions 
before he could have received the alleged advice.
104
 According to his ―Appointment of 
Immigration Judges‖ document Sampson perceived the direct appointment authority to be a 
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vehicle for placing attorneys known to the ―White House offices of Political Affairs, Presidential 
Personnel, and Counsel to the President.‖
105
  Sampson equated immigration judge positions with 
political positions without adherence to civil service laws governing the hiring of career 
Department employees.  
The immigration judge appointment process implemented by Sampson was blatantly 
politically charged. Under Sampson‘s process OAG exercised exclusive control over 
immigration judge selections, and EOIR communicated vacancies directly to the OAG without 
posting vacancy announcements.
106
 Sampson solicited names of candidates from the White 
House, Republican Members of Congress, or previously politically appointed immigration 
judges.
107
  Accepted recommendations were forwarded to EOIR for processing (sometimes 
without a resume).
108
  Sampson‘s practice was generally to refer one candidate for each available 
position.
109
  To ensure candidates‘ Republican affiliations, candidates submitted a PPO Non-
Career Appointment Form to the White House.
110
  The form which required applicants to submit 
a ―political and personal resume,‖ identifying their political party affiliation, voting address for 
2000 and 2004, involvement in the Bush/Cheney campaigns of 2000 and 2004, and point of 
contact for verification of campaign involvement.
111
  
Then Director Rooney and Deputy Director Ohlson stated that any candidate selected by 
the OAG was a ―presumptive hire‖
112
  They also only objected to the appointment of one 
candidate under the illegal hiring process, but otherwise obligingly transmitted a selected 
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candidate‘s paperwork with a recommendation that s/he should be appointed.
113
  While the 
paperwork was routed through Sampson to the ODAG, the candidate was always appointed 
unless s/he later declined the appointment.
114
   
In April 2005, Sampson delegated responsibility for selecting immigration judge 
candidates to OAG‘s White House Liaison, Jan Williams.
115
  A year later, in April 2006, the 
responsibility passed to Williams‘s successor, Monica Goodling.
116
  Both Williams and 
Goodling employed the process implemented by Sampson.
117
  Direct appointments remained the 
exclusive method for hiring immigration judges.  Identification of candidates by Williams and 
Goodling remained the functional equivalent of a hiring decision.  Sampson nonetheless 
maintained sporadic involvement in the immigration judge selections.
118
   
D.  Sampson’s Candidates for Immigration Judge Positions 
  
Numerous candidates recommended to the EOIR were provided by Sampson.  Some of 
the candidates recommended were those directly supported by Karl Rove.  However, the 
majority of candidates that Sampson provided were from the White House Office of Political 
Affairs (WHOPA).
119
  For example, in September 2004 WHOPA provided Sampson candidates 
for positions in El Paso, Texas and Lancaster, California.
120
  The Texas candidate was appointed 
to the immigration judge position, but the California candidate declined the formal offer.
121
  On 
March 17, 2005, Sampson recommended three candidates for two immigration judge positions in 
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Sampson also recommended candidates based on referrals by Republican Members of 
Congress.  On September 16, 2004 Sampson discussed with Ohlson a conversation between then 
Attorney General Ashcroft and Senator Hatch on the subject of an immigration court in Salt 
Lake City.
123
  Senator Hatch had a candidate that he wished to place in the new immigration 
judge position.
124
  This directly contradicts Attorney General Ashcroft‘s lack of knowledge on 
the matter of immigration judge hiring, as the Goodling Report concludes.  On October 20, 2004, 
Senator Hatch‘s candidate submitted his application and was approved, however, the candidate 
later withdrew himself due to family reasons.
125
  Sampson sought another recommendation from 
Senator Hatch which resulted in the appointment of a District of Utah federal prosecutor.
126
 
On August 5, 2005, a Republican Senator from Virginia sent a letter to former Attorney 
General Gonzales recommending immigration judge candidates for Arlington, Virginia.
127
  
Sampson followed up with EOIR, who had not received the candidate‘s name --Sampson 
provided a resume along with a copy of the Senator‘s letter.
128
  The candidate was a career DOJ 
Attorney in the Criminal Division.  On September 21, 2005, Ohlson sent an email to Williams: 
―Kyle Sampson told us to appoint [the candidate] to the open position in Arlington.‖  The 
candidate was duly appointed immigration judge.
129
  
Some candidates appointed to immigration judge positions never interviewed with the 
EOIR.  Garry Malphrus, a staff member to a Republican Senator from South Carolina, contacted 
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Sampson on November 2004 for information on an immigration judge position.  Consequently, 
Sampson emailed Ohlson: ―Malphrus works on immigration policy at the White House.  He is 
interested in speaking with someone about an immigration judge appointment—primarily in the 
info gathering mode.‖
130
  Ohlson stated that Malphrus came to his office and they spoke for 
about 45 minutes but that the meeting was not an interview.
131
  Nonetheless, on December 6, 
2004, Ohlson sent an email stating that: ―[Sampson] would like us to ‗recommend‘ the 
appointment of Garry Malphrus to be IJ in NYC …pending this formal ‗request‘ from the AG‘s 
office …you have a ‗greenlight‘ to hire him.‖
132
  Malphrus was subsequently hired in March 
2005. 
The Malphrus appointment was not an isolated incident.  Williams sent an email to 
Sampson on August 29, 2005 stating, ―Mark Metcalf …‗immigration judge?‘‖  Sampson 
responded, ―ok.‖
133
  Williams informed Metcalf that the Department wanted him to be an 
immigration judge in Orlando, Florida.  Nearly one month later, Ohlson was informed by the 
Chief Immigration Judge that ―Mark Metcalf called the Immigration Court in Orlando, stating 
that he had been offered an immigration judge position, [and] needed to decide by December 1
st
 
whether he wanted to take the job.‖
134
  He wanted the pre-existing judge in Orlando to give him 
a tour of the court.  Neither the immigration judge in Orlando nor Ohlson had heard of 
Metcalf.
135
  Regardless, Metcalf was appointed as an immigration judge in Orlando in February 
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An email from September 2004 from Sampson to Ohlson identified a potential 
immigration judge candidate for Houston, Texas.  The potential Republican candidate‘s resume 
included sections entitled ―Political Training‖ and ―Political Activities and Honors.‖  This 
candidate was appointed as immigration judge in Texas.
137
 
 During the same month in 2004, Sampson identified an immigration judge candidate for 
Louisiana.
138
 The candidate‘s resume featured eleven entries on behalf of the Republican 
Party.
139
  The candidate was appointed as an immigration judge in Louisiana.
140
 
 On November 1, 2005, Sampson contacted Ohlson about a ―very strong candidate that 
[Sampson] would like [Ohlson] to consider‘ for immigration judge in Arlington or Falls Church, 
Virginia, or Baltimore, Maryland.‖
141
  This email was followed by the candidate‘s resume.  
Ohlson duly emailed immigration judge Michael Creppy with Sampson‘s email stating, ―…[W]e 
don‘t have any vacancies in Arlington or Baltimore but we can create a position in the Falls 
Church headquarters. (We really don‘t have any choice in the matter.).‖
142
  On January 8, 2006, 
the candidate was interviewed by EOIR and appointed as an immigration judge in Falls Church, 
Virginia.  The OPR/OIG investigation revealed that the candidate had only emailed Sampson 
twenty minutes prior to Sampson‘s email to Ohlson stating, ―I would like to be considered for 
any immigration judge openings.‖
143
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 As a consequence of such hiring practices many problems arose within the immigration 
system including a significant delay in filling immigration judge vacancies.  The EOIR was 
unable to fill positions until Sampson provided candidates, and these increased vacancies heavily 
burdening the immigration courts.  Consequently, Ohlson continually requested candidate names 
from DAG.  In a May 23, 2005 email from Ohlson to Sampson noted,  
The number of immigration judge vacancies continues to grow.  The fact that so 
many slots have remained vacant for so long is beginning to have a measurable 
impact on the Immigration Courts because the pending case backlog is beginning 





E.  Jan Williams’ Loyalty Pledge 
 
 Jan Williams, then DOJ‘s White House Liaison, was also a source for candidate 
recommendations.  Sampson had instructed Williams to ―contact the White House to get any 
candidate ideas they had for immigration judges.‖
145
  The Presidential Personnel Office was her 
principal source for candidates.
146
  Documentary evidence shows Williams also received 
candidates from the WHOPA.
147
  Scott Jennings, from WHOPA, acknowledged that the White 
House screened candidates for any positions for their ―political qualifications.‖
148
 
 After contacting the White House, Williams provided candidates to the EOIR who were 
deemed ―priority candidates.‖
149
  On May 17, 2005 an email from the White House OPA was 
sent to all White House Liaisons urging Liaisons to ―get creative‖ and find positions for more 
than 100 priority candidates who ―have loyally served the President.‖
150
  Williams responded to 
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this email pledging ―7 slots within 40 days and 40 nights. Let the games begin!‖
151
  Williams 
solicited candidates from Civil Division Political Appointees as well.  A June 21, 2005 email 
from Williams to the White House Williams stated, ―I am running past my deadline please send 
me names by this Wednesday afternoon. These are great opportunities for good people.‖
152
  
Jonathan Cohn had contacted Williams and provided seven candidates‘ names.
153
  Williams 
responded asking, ―Are they like you and me?‖  Cohn responded that two of them were ―tough 
on immigration enforcement.‖
154
  On July 7, Williams transmitted eight names to EOIR.
155
  
Ohlson responded that one candidate was under investigation by the Department for professional 
misconduct, another candidate was impossible to contact, and the third was the one EOIR 
previously objected to.
156
  On July 28, Williams submitted an additional candidate.  By August 




 Evidence suggests that EOIR resisted only one OAG candidate recommendation.  On 
June 7, 2005, a Republican Congressman‘s staff sent an email to the White House 
recommending a ―great Republican‖ for an immigration judge position in New York.
158
  The 
EOIR resisted the candidate due to his inappropriate demeanor.
159
  The OAG did not insist and 
an alternative immigration judge was selected.
160
  This demonstrates that the EOIR had the 
power to resist the political hiring process, but chose not to. 
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 Despite the appointments of selected candidates, the immigration judge backlog 
increased.  In a July 7, 2005 email to Williams Ohlson urged, ―We really are under tremendous 
pressure to continue to adjudicate on a timely basis the flood of cases we receive each month, 
and the only way we can keep up is if we fill immigration judge vacancies in a timely 
manner.‖
161
  Ohlson followed up with an email on July 22 in which he stated: 
Jan—I know you‘re busy, but I need to touch base with you to determine the 
status of the search for immigration judge candidates. DHS enforcement activities 
are continuing to increase the number of aliens who appear in the immigration 
courts. The only way that we can adjudicate these cases in a timely manner is if 
we have a full complement of immigration judges on the bench…as part of the 
Administration‘s effort to ensure that illegal aliens who pose a danger to us are 




On July 26, 2005, Williams authorized Ohlson‘s request to run a nation-wide advertisement.
163
  
Ohlson stressed to Williams that she would be able to maintain her ―ability to personally decide 
candidates.‖
164
  As a result of the advertisement, each vacancy received five to ten resumes 
which were then forwarded from EOIR to the OAG.
165
 
 Only candidates responding to the July vacancy announcement that were also endorsed 
by the White House or other Republican appointees were selected by Williams.  One candidate 
was selected after an endorsement by the politically appointed immigration judge, Garry 
Malphrus.
166
  The candidate was appointed as immigration judge in Los Angeles, California. 
Malphrus also recommended another candidate who responded to the advertisement.
167
  The 
second candidate was also appointed.  Another candidate who had also replied to the 
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 Additional White House candidates were provided to EOIR.  The White House OPA sent 
an email to Williams on March 3, 2006 recommending another candidate.
169
  The candidate had 
served as local counsel for the Republican National Committee.
170
  Williams forwarded the 
candidate‘s resume to Ohlson for the New Jersey seat, and the candidate was promptly appointed 
as immigration judge in New Jersey.
171
  Subsequently, another White House OPA recommended 
candidate was hired as an immigration judge in May 2006.
172
   
The candidates from the nation-wide announcement received no consideration unless 
they were independently endorsed by the White House or political appointees.
173
  With the small 
amount of referrals passing through, the shortage of immigration judges and immigration 
caseload both increased.
174
  A September 21, 2005 email from Ohlson to Williams again advised 
Williams of the numerous immigration judge vacancies.
175
  Emails were sent again on November 
14, 2005, January 26, 2006, and March 1, 2006.
176
  Williams responded to the OPR/OIG 
investigators that it was ―incredibly hard‖ to find immigration judge candidates, and that she 
asked Ohlson for candidates ―repeatedly.‖
177
  The Goodling Report concluded that the evidence 
did not support Williams‘s assertion, nor did she consider resumes forwarded by EOIR.  On the 
contrary, Ohlson recommended one candidate whom Williams ignored.
178
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 Evidence also shows that Williams used search terms in order to screen candidates.  At a 
White House Presidential Personnel Office seminar, Williams received a document entitled ―The 
Thorough Process of Investigation‖ outlining search strings to conduct Lexis Nexis searches.
179
 
Williams, however, claimed that she ―never used the search string.‖
180
  In an April 2006 email, 
Williams forwarded Goodling a search string saying, ―This is the lexis nexis search string that I 
used for AG appointments.‖
181
  At the OPR/OIG interview Williams denied the email and use of 
the search string.
182
  However, the following day Williams sent an email to investigators stating 
that she received the string from a ―researcher in the White House Office of Presidential 
Personnel‖ and she edited it to remove ―words like homosexual.‖
183
  Williams also claimed that 
she had used the search string for one political vacancy in the Department‘s Environmental and 
Natural Resources Division in December 2005 and ―never ever used it to reach Immigration 
Judges.‖
184
 She added that the string sent to Goodling did not contain ―homosexual.‖
185
  The 
investigation, however, revealed that Williams used the unedited string on a few occasions 
including multiple times in November and December 2005 and January 2006.
186
  Williams used 
the search string to research twenty-five people, twenty-three of whom were candidates for the 
National Advisory Committee on Violence Against Women.
187
  None of the people were 
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F.  Goodling’s Politicized Hirings of Immigration Judges 
 
Goodling continued Williams‘ practice of making recommendations to EOIR. Goodling 
followed the same selection process for immigration judges as Williams and candidates 
forwarded to the EOIR remained presumptive hires.
189
  Goodling also used the search string 
provided by Williams to research candidates that she interviewed.
190
  She also discussed the 
immigration judge positions with various individuals she was screening for political positions.
191
  
Goodling‘s written statement to Congress notes that Sampson told her that the OLC had advised 
that ―[i]mmigration judge appointments were not subject to the civil service rules applicable to 
other career positions.‖
192
  Goodling also testified that she assumed immigration judge hiring 
rules ―applied to BIA positions as well.‖
193
 
 The principal source for immigration judge candidates after Goodling took over from 
Williams in October 2005 continued to be the White House.
194
  Scott Jennings at the WHOPA 
exchanged numerous emails with Goodling regarding White House candidates for immigration 
judge.
195
  On August 22, 2006, Jennings emailed Goodling recommending an immigration judge 
candidate whose political credentials the White House had already verified.
196
  Candidates 
recommended by the White House had verified political credentials because they were solicited 
from the Republican National Lawyers‘ Association, Republican National Committeemen, 
Republican Party officials, the Federalist Society, and other prominent Republicans.
197
  Goodling 
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 Goodling, like Williams, continued to politically screen the candidates for immigration 
judge positions. The screenings included the Internet research on candidates‘ political 
contributions, voter registration records, variations on the Williams Lexis Nexis string search, 
and questions regarding political affiliation during interviews and in reference checks.
199
 
 Many candidates that Goodling screened were candidates considered for both career and 
political positions.
200
  The first such candidate was recommended by Senator Hatch, and he filled 
a PPO form indicating that he was Republican and voted for President Bush.
201
  Only after the 
candidate stated that he was uninterested in the immigration judge positions did Goodling 
discuss possible political appointments with him.
202
  Another candidate was referred to Goodling 
by Attorney General Gonzales‘s speechwriter.
203
  Upon interviewing the candidate Goodling 
inquired into his political affiliations, party contributions, and thereafter indicated that filling 
immigration judge positions was a priority.
204
  The candidate withdrew his interest in the 
immigration judge position.
205
  Another candidate indicated to OPR/OIG that Goodling seemed 
to have had a ―checklist‖ during the interview.
206
  During the interview, Goodling had inquired 
as to what kind of conservative he was, his favorite Supreme Court justice, and his views on the 
death penalty.  Her notes indicated the candidate was ―Cons. On ‗god, guns + gays‘.‖
207
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 Goodling testified before Congress that she ―recommended seven people to be 
interviewed for immigration judges and four to be appointed to the BIA‖ admitting that she took 
―political considerations into account‖ for those positions.
208
  She forwarded candidates to EOIR 
including five to Ohlson for consideration on July 31, 2006.
209
  Ohlson responded stating that 
three candidates had interviews to be scheduled, the EOIR had no information on the fourth 
candidate, and the fifth was known.
210
  Four of the six candidates recommended by Goodling had 
letters of recommendation from Republican Members of Congress, and a fifth was recommended 
by the White House.
211
  Goodling also forwarded candidates recommended by Bradley 
Schlozman, a political appointee in the Department.
212
  In fact, a December 4, 2006 
recommendation email from Bradley Schlozman to Goodling stated: 
Let me say his views on immigration are virtually identical to my own. …I will 
get his resume for you, but don‘t be dissuaded by his ACLU work on voting 
matters from years ago. This is a very different man, and particularly on 




Goodling sent an email to EOIR to ―consider‖ the recommended candidate for an immigration 
judge at EOIR Headquarters.
214




 As the political screenings progressed, the immigration judge vacancy backlog increased.  
In fact, vacancies and workload worsened during Goodling‘s tenure due to her additional 
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  In August 2006, Goodling contacted Ohlson saying that she would be 
―happy to see what names [Ohlson had] for some of these her openings.‖
217
  Ohlson responded: 
[We] have compiled a binder that contains resumes of the ten best candidates who 
applied for the immigration judge and specifically asked to be assigned to these 
designated cities. This binder is being sent to you this afternoon. …Once you 





Upon following up on the recommended candidates, Ohlson was informed that Goodling was 
conducting ―background research on the candidates.‖
219
  On September 20, 2006, Ohlson sent 
additional vacancies to Goodling and faxed resumes of potential candidates.
220
  The evidence 
shows that Goodling did not select any of the dozens of candidates submitted to her by the EOIR 
in the binder or subsequent faxes.
221
  In November 2006, Ohlson sent an urgent email to the 
ODAG stating, ―The bottom line is that we have TWENTY-FIVE immigration judge vacancies 
that need to be filled.‖
222





G.  Republican Immigration Judges Recommend Candidates 
  
 Perhaps among the most egregious findings in the Goodling Report were revelations that 
Garry Malphrus and Mark Metcalf provided immigration judge recommendations to Goodling 
along with another immigration judge in Florida, Rex Ford.
224
  In April 2006, Malphrus emailed 
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Sampson recommending that Ford be considered for Chief Immigration Judge based on 
―experience, leadership, and loyalty to the Bush Administration.‖
225
 
 Metcalf also recommended numerous candidates.  The first candidate was recommended 
by Ford to Metcalf.
226
  Goodling instructed the EOIR to ―consider‖ the candidate, and he was 
promptly appointed as an immigration judge.
227
  In November 2006 Metcalf sent Goodling 
another recommendation for a candidate supported by both Malphrus and Ford.
228
  A month 
later, Metcalf recommended an additional six persons that ―have been vetted here in Miami by 
Judge Ford.‖
229
  The first candidate was a former elected official on the Republican Executive 
Committee of Palm Beach Country who was recommended highly by Rex Ford.
230
  The second 
candidate was an immigration lawyer and wife of Metcalf‘s immigration judge mentor.
231
  The 
third candidate was an immigration judge that Ford was familiar with.
232
  The fourth candidate 
was a long-time friend of Metcalf and member of the Federalist Society.
233
  The fifth candidate 
was a DHS attorney with only four years of experience.
234
  And the sixth candidate was 
supported by a ―Former Associate White House Counsel under Reagan.‖
235
  Goodling‘s resume 
comment on the six candidate noted ―conservative.‖
236
  Metcalf recommended at least three 
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additional candidates to Goodling in January 2007.
237
  Two of the candidates were sponsored by 




H.  Goodling Extends Sampson’s Hiring Process to BIA Members 
  
 Goodling also used the vetting process for positions on the BIA.  On August 30, 2006, 
Goodling asked an OLC attorney about the legal framework for hiring the Chair and Vice Chair 
on the BIA.
239
  The OLC attorney sent an ―informal‖ memo noting that an OLC would create a 
―formal version for future reference that will include hiring ordinary immigration judges and 
Board Members.‖
240
  The informal memo explained that the Chair of BIA was a career SES 
position, and one or two Vice Chair positions were career SES positions.  The others were 
Schedule A career positions.
241
  The formal memo regarding immigration judge hiring was 
completed on March 29, 2007, and the formal memo regarding BIA member hiring was 
completed on August 8, 2007.
242
 
 Nevertheless, Goodling continued to select BIA candidates based on political and 
ideological considerations for four vacancies.
243
  The first candidate she selected for the BIA was 
aforementioned Immigration Judge Garry Malphrus.
244
  The second candidate had support from 
DOJ political appointees.
245
  The third candidate was a career government attorney who 
contacted Sampson through church contacts to express an interest in an immigration judge 
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  Sampson endorsed this candidate as a ―very good guy.‖
247
  Since the candidate was 
unable to take the immigration judge seat, Goodling considered him for a BIA spot.  The 
candidate stated to the OPR/OIG that the interview questions indicated that Goodling was trying 
to ―get at [his] political views.‖
248
  The fourth candidate was a career Department attorney in the 
Civil Division‘s Office of Immigration Litigation.
249
  The candidate expressed interests to 
Jonathan Cohn, a Department political appointee and other appointees, and gave his resume to 
Rachel Brand, the AAG for the Office of Legal Policy.
250
  Brand contacted Goodling describing 
the candidate as ―completely on the team.‖
251
  On January 5, 2007, Goodling emailed the OAG 
Deputy Chief of Staff and others that Attorney General Gonzales had ―approved‖ Malphrus and 
three other candidates for appointments to the BIA.
252
  However, the Civil Division halted 
Goodling‘s BIA appointments stating that the ―OLC and [the Civil Division] need to confer 
regarding whether the current procedures for selecting/appointing Board [of Immigration 




 Around this period, a hiring freeze was implemented.  This hiring freeze was in response 
to issues arising in the aforementioned Gonzalez case.
254
  The Civil Division attorneys 
representing the DOJ interviewed both Sampson and Goodling. On December 11, 2006, 
Sampson explained to the Civil Division attorneys that the OAG was exercising its direct 
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appointment authority, and how that differed from past practices involving EOIR selections.
255
 
On January 5, 2007, Goodling stated to the Civil Division attorneys that she and Angela 
Williamson were responsible for screening candidates before sending them to EOIR for 
interviews.
256
  In an email two days later a Civil Division attorney stated, ―Monica made it clear 
that she does not inquire about or consider political affiliation in generating candidates.‖
257
  The 
Civil Division attorney further told investigators, ―I did specifically ask her whether political 
affiliation was taken into account.  She told me no.‖
258
  As a result of the Civil Division and 
OLC‘s legal analysis of execution of the direct appointment authority, the DOJ suspended all 
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III. Report Conclusion and Recommendations 
“The Department is going to take a greater role in IJ hiring.” 
 Subsequent to this investigation and hiring freeze, former Attorney General Gonzales 
approved a new process for immigration judges on April 2, 2007, after consultation with OAG, 
ODAG, EOIR, and approval by OLC, JMD, and OARM.
260
  The Gonzales procedure overturned 
the Sampson-Williams-Goodling process and returned most of the screening, evaluation, and 
selection of candidates to EOIR.   
The new process entails a review of the applications submitted to public vacancy 
announcements by the EOIR‘s immigration judge, who rates each candidate.
261
  The immigration 
judge then obtains writing samples and references of the highest rated candidates and a three-
member EOIR panels interview all top-tier candidates.
262
  The three-member panels consist of 
two Deputy Chief Immigration Judges or Assistant Chief Immigration Judges, and a senior EOIR 
manager.
263
  The panels create packets for each candidate including a resume, interview 
summaries, and other information for review by the EOIR Director and the Chief Immigration 
Judge, who together select at least three candidates for a vacancy to recommend for final 
consideration.
264
  A second three-member panel then interviews as many of the three candidates 
as appropriate or as needed, and recommends one candidate for the DAG to recommend to the 
Attorney General for final approval.
265
  Both the DAG and Attorney General retain the authority 
to request additional candidates.
266
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 Ohlson, who was appointed Director of EOIR in September 2007 despite his complicity 
in the former illegal hiring process, stated that the new hiring process has been working 
efficiently absent any evidence of politicized hiring.
267
  Thirteen immigration judges have been 
hired since the process was initiated, and others have been selected.
268
  Nonetheless, 
appointments are delayed due to a new requirement that calls for the completion of a background 
investigation prior to an appointment.
269
   
 The revised appointment process also applies to BIA appointments.  This revised process 
requires public advertisement for vacancies.
270
  The minimum requirements for applicants are: 1) 
citizenship, 2) a law degree, and 3) seven years of relevant post-bar experience.
271
  The 
applicants are also reviewed by a three-member panel which rates them, conducts reference 
checks, interviews top-tier candidates, and then recommends at least one candidate for each 
vacancy to DAG.
272
 The panel includes the EOIR Director (or designee), a career SES employee 
designated by DAG, and a non-career SES designated by DAG.  At least one candidate for each 
vacancy is forwarded by DAG to the Attorney General.
273
  Ohlson reported that the BIA hiring 
process is also working efficiently without evidence of politicized hiring.
274
  Five of seven BIA 
vacancies have been filled under the new process, after undergoing background investigations.
275
   
 The Goodling Report concludes with an assessment of staff conduct.  The Report found 
that Sampson systematically violated DOJ policy and federal law by considering political or 
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ideological affiliations in soliciting and evaluating candidates for immigration judges.
276
  The 
process implemented by Sampson was contrary to the federal law with regard to civil service 
employees, and historical practice of EOIR in filling immigration judge vacancies.
277
  His claims 
alleging a conversation with Ohlson and advice from the OLC led him to believe that 
immigration judge hiring was not subject to civil service requirements were unsubstantiated.
278
  
The record indicates that he contemplated using political considerations at least six months prior 
to his alleged conversation with Ohlson.
279
  Even if Sampson was confused or mistaken in his 
interpretation of the rules, the Goodling Report concludes his actions constituted misconduct 
because he systematically violated federal law and DOJ policy.
280
  
 Jan Williams also systematically violated DOJ policy and federal law by considering 
political or ideological affiliations in the appointment of immigration judges.
281
  Most of her 
duties entailed finding candidates for political appointments.
282
  Williams stated that she did not 
know that immigration judges were not political positions, and that Sampson directed her to 
contact the White House to obtain immigration judge candidates.
283
  Evidence shows that 
Williams turned to White House Office of Political Affairs and the White House Presidential 
Personnel Office, as well as to other political appointees and the Federalist Society, to solicit 
candidates while ignoring EOIR supplied candidates.
284
  However, according to the OPR/OIG, 
                                                          
276
  See id. at 117. 
277
  Id. 
278
  Id. 
279
  See id. 
280
  GOODLING REPORT at 118. 
281
  See id. 
282
  Id. 
283
  Id. 
284
  Id. at 118-19. 
 49 
because Williams was not an attorney and followed her supervisor‘s guidance in selecting 
immigration judges she did not commit misconduct.
285
  
Monica Goodling also systematically violated DOJ policy and federal law by considering 
political and ideological affiliations in soliciting and evaluating candidates for immigration 
judges and BIA members.
286
  Goodling admitted to considering political and ideological 
affiliations in the appointment of immigration judges and BIA members stating that Sampson 
told her that such hiring was not subject to civil service laws.
287
  She stated that she assumed the 
same was true for BIA members.
288
  Evidence shows that Goodling used the aforementioned 
Williams‘ search string to research candidates, including those that applied in response to public 
vacancy announcements forwarded to her by EOIR.
289
  Several instances exist where she asked 
immigration judge or BIA candidates to fill out White House PPO forms.
290
  Evidence also 
indicates that Goodling was aware that political factors could not be considered in hiring for 
career immigration judge positions, yet she continued to research political affiliations of 
candidates.
291
  She also told several immigration judge and BIA candidates who protested to 
filling PPO forms that they should not have been asked to complete the forms.
292
  Further, she 
initially informed Civil Division attorneys that she did not use political criteria in evaluating 
immigration judges and BIA members.
293
  These actions indicated to the OPR/OIG that 
Goodling was in fact aware that it was illegal to use political criteria for civil service positions.  
Additionally, Goodling acknowledged that Sampson never told her that civil service laws did not 
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apply to BIA member hiring, and she ignored advice from the OLC regarding her inquiry as to 
the legal framework for hiring Chair and Vice Chair of the BIA.
294
  Therefore, the OPR/OIG 
found that Goodling engaged in misconduct specifically for making misrepresentations to the 
Civil Division attorneys defending the Gonzalez litigation.
295
 
According to the OPR/OIG, neither former Director Rooney nor then Deputy Director 
Ohlson violated federal law or DOJ policy, or engaged in misconduct with respect to hiring 
immigration judges or BIA members.
296
  Despite evidence to the contrary, the report credited 
their assertion of ignorance as to OAG‘s consideration of political or ideological affiliations in 
selecting candidates.
297
  However, the investigators concluded that sufficient evidence existed for 
Rooney and Ohlson to have realized political or ideological affiliations played a role in the 
selection process.
298
  The investigators noted that a high number of candidates whose resumes 
reflected Republican credentials, the sponsorship of candidates by Republican Members of 
Congress, and EOIR‘s inability to get OAG to consider any applications identified through 
public announcements should have put Rooney and Ohlson on notice.
299
  While Rooney and 
Ohlson made repeated efforts to persuade OAG to allow them to post advertisements and raised 
attention to the growing immigration judge vacancies, they had enough information about issues 
concerning the selection process that they should have brought it to the attention of other senior 
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The Goodling Report came to numerous conclusions after the investigation and posited 
various recommendations.  It found that the aforementioned staff illegally subjected career 
position candidates to political evaluations.  These staff members considered political or 
ideological affiliations when recommending and selecting candidates for other permanent career 
positions, which resulted in the rejection of high-quality candidates in favor of less-qualified 
candidates.  The Goodling Report supports the conclusion that the actions of the staff members 
involved in the politicized hiring process, including Rooney and Ohlson in their complacency, 
damaged the Department and the immigration court system.  The Goodling Report suggests that 
policies needed to be clarified regarding the use of political and ideological affiliations to select 
career attorney candidates for temporary details within the Department.
301
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CHAPTER 3:  SURVEYS 
I. Introduction and Analysis 
In order to assess qualitative information about the decisions made by immigration judges 
illegally hired by the Department of Justice, the National Immigration Project members formed a 
committee.  The committee submitted surveys to attorneys who were aware of having practiced 
before the known illegally hired immigration judges appointed during 2004 and 2007 to 
determine whether these judges were familiar with legal standards in immigration law.  The list 
of immigration judges included in the survey was incomplete, and created by comparing other 
sources‘ lists of immigration judges to the date on which a particular judge was hired.  For 
example, one source was a list of judges attached to a New York Times article about disparities 
in asylum decisions by immigration judges hired during the period that the illegal procedures 
were in effect.
302
  The surveys additionally sought to investigate whether the judges‘ written or 
oral decisions adhered to legal standards.  The objective was to compare the decisions of these 
judges to current case law in order to assess the quality of decision-making.   
The surveys required the name of the immigration judge and general information about 
that judge, along with a description of the judge‘s ruling on applications for relief from removal, 
including asylum, withholding of removal, non-Legal Permanent Resident and Legal Permanent 
Resident Cancellation of Removal.  The surveys sought to ascertain a judge‘s reliance on, or 
departure from, relevant case law and statutes.   
 The committee received approximately fifteen responses.  These surveys yielded some 
unexpected results.  First, some of the surveys received about the immigration judges hired had 
neutral, or even positive, comments about the judge‘s demeanor and openness to learn 
                                                          
302
  Charlie Savage, Vetted Judges More Likely to Reject Asylum Bids, By the Numbers, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 23, 2008 
(http://www.nytimes.com/imagepages/2008/08/24/washington/24judges-graphic.html). 
 53 
immigration law.  But none of these surveys elucidated much beyond a couple of neutral or 
positive sentences about the referenced judge.  Furthermore, the respondents did not fully utilize 
the survey forms.  These short responses may be a result of various factors.  The single most 
obvious factor is the responding attorney‘s hesitancy to comment about a judge s/he regularly 
appears before.  For example, some practitioners were apprehensive to complete the survey or 
describe their experiences before judges hired between 2004 and 2007 because they feared 
retaliation by the judges or the Board of Immigration Appeals.  Many believed that a description 
of the case could lead the judge or the BIA to identify the case, and that their clients would 
sustain adverse outcomes.  Also, perhaps, despite their illegal hiring, some of these judges may 
have made concerted efforts to educate themselves in the field of immigration law and adjudicate 
cases in an impartial matter.  Unfortunately, the ambiguity remains. 
 Although most judges received neutral comments, some surveys pointed negatively 
towards some of the illegally hired judges.  Another unexpected result was that some of the 
surveys signaled problems with judges outside of those within the scope of the Goodling 
Report‘s analysis.  This finding may be an indicator of bias permeating the entire immigration 
system beyond just those judges appointed during this specific time period.  Simply removing 
the judges appointed during the time period investigated by the OPR/OIG will not be enough to 
remove political bias from the system.  Changes should be made at all levels of the immigration 










CHAPTER 4:  RECOMMENDATIONS 
I. Summary and Recommendations 
 Based on extensive research and examinations of DOJ hiring practices and in light of the 
above referenced OPR/OIG Goodling Report we have compiled a series of recommendations 
intended to remedy the consequences of the Sampson-Williams-Goodling hiring process.  
Moreover, following a review of testimonies and research by academics, policymakers, and 
government officials about structural defects in the broader immigration court system, we have 
taken the liberty to include recommendations that address these defects.   
Although the DOJ has halted the Sampson-Williams-Goodling hirings, no action has 
been taken with regard to the appointments that occurred during this period.  For this reason, our 
basic and most fundamental recommendation is for the removal of judicial appointees processed 
and hired during the period between 2004 and 2007.  Those who were appointed through 
political considerations should be given the opportunity to reapply for their positions on a merit-
based hiring standard as outlined in our recommendations.  Additionally, we recommend that the 
three immigration judges who participated in the illegal hiring process, Garry Malphrus, Mark 
Metcalf, and Rex Ford be removed from their current positions.  We also recommend offering 
BIA positions to former BIA judges who were reassigned or forced to resign as a consequence of 
former Attorney General Ashcroft‘s 2002 streamlining rule.  Finally, we believe the current 
hiring process continues to be deficient, not only because the criteria for hiring immigration 
judges continues to lack a requirement for experience in immigration law, but also because there 




  With these fundamental necessities in mind, this white paper outlines the 
following recommendations indispensible to effective court reform: 
Reapplication Process For Illegally Hired Judges and EOIR Assessment 
1. The DOJ should require every identified hiree to reapply for his or her position through a 
merit-based hiring process, such as the process outlined in item 3.
304
   
 
2.  All immigration judge vacancies should be filled in accordance with the legal hiring process 
including minimum qualifications in immigration law. 
 
3. Nation-wide postings requiring the following qualifications should be used for vacancies: 
 
1. U.S. Citizenship;  
2. 7 years of relevant post-bar experience, of which 5 years include experience in 
immigration practice, teaching, advocacy or litigation; 
3. Knowledge of U.S. immigration laws and procedures; and 
4. The candidate must possess 2 or more of the following: 
a. Substantial litigation experience, preferably in a high-volume content; 
b. Experience handling complex legal issues; 
c. Experience conducting administrative hearings; or 
d. Knowledge of judicial practices and procedures. 
 
4. The DOJ should create or expand an existing position within EOIR that coordinates closely 
with the Office for Professional Responsibility and monitors EOIR practices and policies, 
including but not limited to hiring, retention, and firing.  The EOIR should create a mechanism 
for the public and government officials to file complaints alleging illegal practices and policies.  
 
5. The EOIR should ensure that its hiring policy draws potentially eligible candidates equally 
from the government and private sectors.  
 
Engraved above the main entrance to the Supreme Court is "Equal Justice Under the 
Law," however, analysis of the illegally hired judges has found that most have little to no 
knowledge in immigration law, and on average, they were more likely to rule against asylum 
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seekers than their colleagues on the same court.
305
  Justice can hardly be served, much less 
equally, under such circumstances.  These immigration judges must be removed irrespective of 
the quality of their decision-making, and given the opportunity to reapply for their position under 
a legal hiring process.  Frankly no other institution, from country clubs to law schools, allows 
fraudulently hired or acquired members to retain their membership.  The continued service of 
any illegally hired judge violates the neutrality and fundamental principles of justice and due 
process in U.S. immigration courts.  New judges should be legally hired in accordance with the 
hiring recommendations outlined, including minimum qualifications and training in immigration 
law.  A potential candidates‘ knowledge of immigration law should be assessed by an 
examination in basic immigration law, and followed up with ongoing training. 
Additionally, the fact that both EOIR former Deputy Director Kevin Ohlson and former 
Director Kevin Rooney had knowledge of, and were directly involved in, the illegal process 
merits serious evaluation of the institutional mechanisms within the EOIR to address violations.  
It also highlights a fundamental problem within the EOIR‘s structure.  The illegal hiring process 
discussed here continued for nearly four years and resulted in the hiring of immigration judges 
with the direct approval of, and accommodation by, EOIR leadership.  While these staff 
members were not involved in creating the illegal hiring process, they dutifully implemented and 
supported the process despite acknowledging and even jesting about its illegality.  The EOIR 
must therefore incorporate an institutional process by which members are required to formally 
complain to objectionable processes and practices.  Finally, sanctions for violations of DOJ 
policy should be extended to all participants in illegal practices, as is consistent with other areas 
of U.S. law and policy. 
                                                          
305
  See TRAC Reports-- Bush Administration Plan to Improve Immigration Courts Lags (2008), 
http://trac.syr.edu/immigration/reports/194/. 
 57 
Hiring and Evaluation of Personnel  
 
1.  Increase the number of immigration judges through an efficient and non-political vetting 
process in order to diminish the current backlog of cases. 
 
2.  Establish minimum qualifications for immigration judges and BIA members. 
 
3.  Prohibit removal or threat of removal of legally hired immigration judges and BIA members, 
and restore decisional independence of judges.
306
    
 
 
In order to ensure that political hiring does not affect the judicial process, it is imperative 
that political ideology is absent from both hiring and firing decisions while on the bench.  While 
it is important to fill the vacancies and ease the case backlog, appointed judges must be qualified 
to handle immigration proceedings.  Minimum qualifications must be established in order to 
eradicate the appointment of unqualified candidates, and to ensure that the best possible 
candidates are being instated.  In addition to vetting judges prior to appointment, continued 
review of a judge‘s potential political bias is necessary to ensure due process.  Evidence suggests 
that some judges who were not political appointees nonetheless have alarmingly high 
percentages of immigration denials; some have denial rates higher than the judges politically 




Immigration Judge and BIA Member Evaluations 
 
1.  Ensure that performance reviews include a metric for professional conduct for gauging 
independence and impartiality in decisionmaking.  
 
2.  Require that immigration judges complete a basic immigration law examination to assess 
their knowledge of U.S. immigration law.
308
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testing new immigration judges in April 2008, and new BIA members in August 2008.‖). 
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3.  Improve training for immigration judges and BIA members. 
 
 Beyond the non-partisan hiring changes, decisions by all immigration judges should be 
reviewed to gauge their professional conduct and the impartiality of their decisions.  Although 
changes in the hiring process itself should remove blatant political hires, bias may still be a 
factor even with non-political hires.  If judges know that their decisions will be reviewed for 
evidence of bias, they may make a more concerted effort to ensure the discretionary aspects of 
immigration law are decided fairly, and applicable law is followed.  Although knowledge of 
immigration law should be a part of the hiring criteria, comprehensive training in the field of 
immigration law will help further ensure that immigration judges are making informed decisions 
based on the law and not on political values.  Impartiality of immigration judges is vital due to 
the deference given to the judge‘s discretion on appeal. 
 
Board of Immigration Appeals  
 
1. Repeal the streamlining processes within the EOIR implemented by former AG Ashcroft in 
2002. 
 
2.  Offer BIA positions to the former BIA judges who were reassigned or who were forced to 
resign under former AG Ashcroft.  
 




4.  Reinstate the requirement that precedent decisions be decided by the BIA en banc. 
 




6.  Restore three-member panels for Board of Immigration Appeals reviews, especially for cases 
involving asylum, withholding of removal, and relief under the Convention Against Torture.  
Rescind regulations that limit three-member panel review of all but a limited number of facially 
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 First and foremost, the streamlining processes implemented by the former Attorney 
Generals should be abandoned.  The reduction of the number BIA judges should be reversed and 
increased, or at a minimum restored to the original number of twenty-three judges.  The minimal 
increase from eleven to fifteen is unacceptable.  The hiring process for BIA judges should also 
be merit-based.  Minimum qualifications including knowledge of immigration law and 
impartiality must be endorsed throughout the immigration system.  In order to ensure that this 
hiring process is implemented, the roles of immigration judges and BIA members should be 
codified into the INA. 
 Furthermore, the makeup of a BIA panel should also be reorganized.  Three-member 
panels for BIA reviews should restored, and single member opinions should be limited to 
ministerial and truly non-controversial matters, such as an unopposed motion to reopen.  The 
BIA should decide all precedent cases en banc.  Due process is more likely to be served, and 
biases diminished, if appeals are brought before an impartial multi-member panel instead of a 




1.  The public list of immigration judges appointed through the illegal hiring process is 
incomplete, and created by comparing other sources‘ lists of immigration judges to the date on 
which a particular judge was hired.  The DOJ should release the names of former and current 
immigration judges illegally hired between 2004 and 2007. 
 
2.  All decisions, including BIA affirming the lower court, should include a written explanation 
of the judge‘s rationale for the decision. 
 




 All decisions should have a written rationale so that decisions can be assessed for 
accurate application of laws, and appeals to the Federal Court of Appeals can be processed 
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without a rehearing of the case as it passed before the BIA.  Even cases decided by judicial 
discretion should have a written decision or memorandum attached for the purposes of reviewing 
a judge‘s bias.   
 These aforementioned recommendations are fundamental steps to ensure that established 
immigration law is uniformly applied and adhered to by judges.  Merely implementing a removal 
and reapplication process for judges appointed during the time period addressed in the Goodling 
Report is not enough, although it is a vital step.  The entire immigration process must be 
analyzed and revised to remedy weaknesses and flaws that allow for transgressions of U.S. 
immigration law and violations of due process in the immigration system. 
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